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Many of the most fundamental and frequent controversies in economics 
revolve around two related sets of issues: the salience and significance 
of market failures and the role of the state in overcoming them. They 
arise in a particularly acute form in the literature on industrial policies. 
Broadly understood, industrial policy refers to public policy measures 
aimed at influencing the allocation and accumulation of resources, and 
the choice of technologies. A particularly important set of industrial poli-
cies, at the center of many of the chapters in this volume, comprises those 
targeted at activities that promote learning and technological upgrading. 
They are sometimes more accurately labeled as learning, industrial and 
technology (LIT) policies. We use the term to cover both deliberate and 
self-described industrial policies as well as policies that have a similar 
effect though they are not labeled as “industrial policies” (this is particu-
larly well illustrated by Antonio Andreoni’s contribution, chapter 9).
Industrial policies became virtually ousted from the set of policy pre-
scriptions proffered by economists—even if they were often resorted to 
in practice—in the heyday of neoliberalism, with the Washington con-
sensus policies heavily biased in favor of largely unfettered markets.1 
There has been a resurgence of interest in industrial policies in recent 
years, and such policies have even come to be advocated by the World 
Bank.2 This revival prompted the Initiative for Policy Dialogue (IPD) 
and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to establish a joint 
task force on industrial policies. The task force’s work was motivated in 
part by the neglect of research into industrial policies in the long period 
the subject was in exile from academic research and policy analysis, and 
especially from that of multilateral organizations. Issues requiring further 
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exploration included those pertaining to development finance and the 
links between the recent literature on industrial policies and that on 
growth and structural transformations. There has been, moreover, new 
empirical work on different experiences with industrial policies and new 
insights into the debate on static vs. dynamic efficiency and on mitigation 
of risks.
The historical experience of advanced economies at or near the frontier 
of technology, attests to the vital role that industrial policies played in 
sustained economic growth and transformation.3 This provides compel-
ling testimony to the critical role of governments in fostering sustained 
economic progress. Moreover, there are good theoretical reasons for the 
type of public policy interventions that constitute what we have called 
LIT and industrial policies. These are elaborated in chapter 2 by Mario 
Cimoli and Giovanni Dosi, and in chapter 3 by José Antonio Ocampo. 
Before we turn to these and the other chapters that comprise this volume, 
it would be apposite to comment on one objection to industrial policies: 
What may be good in theory may be vitiated by the risks of poor design 
and implementation. The answer to this objection is, first, that while 
industrial policies are not sufficient by themselves for success in economic 
development, both historical experience and theory indicate that they are 
virtually necessary. Second, yes there are risks stemming from institutional 
imperfections and political economy “failures,” but such problems are by 
no means confined to industrial policy as demonstrated, for example, by 
many failed programs of macroeconomic stabilization or of liberalization 
and privatization. The challenge for public policy is to get the risk–reward 
ratio right. That industrial policy has the potential to provide plentiful 
rewards and that there are ways to obtain them and mitigate risks of fail-
ure are amongst the central contentions of this collection of essays.
The rest of the volume comprises three parts. Part I elaborates on the 
conceptual and theoretical foundations of LIT or industrial policies. 
Part II focuses on an aspect that has been relatively neglected in the recent 
literature, even as its importance has been widely recognized: develop-
ment finance, in particular development banks. The primary focus of 
part III is on experiences and experiments with industrial policies, their 
lessons, and proposals about their design and implementation. In this 
overview, we pay particular attention to part I. This quick sketch cannot, 
of course, do justice to the chapters and is aimed more at whetting the 
appetite and drawing some salient links between the various contribu-
tions than at providing a summary.
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Chapter 2 by Cimoli and Dosi draws heavily on Cimoli, Dosi, and 
Stiglitz (2009). It begins by noting that LIT policies and associated institu-
tion building play a vital role in sustained economic progress and trans-
formation. At the outset Cimoli and Dosi emphasize the pervasiveness of 
market failures, noting that the conditions required for the standard nor-
mative welfare theorems to hold are far from the conditions that prevail 
in the real world: “The whole world can be seen as a huge market failure!” 
They recognize that the question in practice is more one of whether the 
deficiencies are sufficiently serious to warrant active policy intervention, 
including in shaping institutions. They observe that this way of posing 
the question shifts the burden of proof away from those who believe that 
the presumption should be to avoid interventions in markets. 
In particular, Cimoli and Dosi point to the severe shortcomings of 
markets in dealing with knowledge and information. Knowledge is 
essentially a public good (in the sense of Samuelson). But the nexus of 
technology, learning, and information is at the heart of sustained growth 
and catch-up. Cimoli and Dosi further note that most firms are operat-
ing below “best practice” even within the same economy and that this 
pervasive phenomenon raises the question of whether the standard pro-
duction possibility curve makes sense even within a sector or a country. 
Most importantly, they argue that comparative advantage “needs to be 
re-examined: a country’s comparative advantage is based in part on its 
comparative learning capabilities.” Many of the policies that “enhance 
economy-wide learning are the opposite of those derived from the stan-
dard neoclassical model.”4 Cimoli and Dosi also point to the trade-offs 
that may arise between static efficiency and the dynamics of learning 
and technology along similar lines to the more detailed elaboration of 
that theme in the contribution by Ocampo (see below).
A particular kind of information problem that developing countries 
face is called the coordination problem. In well-functioning market econo-
mies, prices serve this role. Even there, prices often fail to provide the 
necessary coordination, but in the context of development, industrial 
policies can help overcome coordination problems of the sort recognized 
in the early development literature (e.g., Nurkse 1953; Gerschenkron 1962; 
Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Hirschman 1958; and Prebisch 1963). 
While stressing that there are no “magic policy bullets,” Cimoli and 
Dosi identify broad types of policy prescriptions revolving around the 
“necessity of nurturing infants.” In particular, Cimoli and Dosi provide 
a taxonomy identifying seven broad “domains of policy intervention” 
4 LEARNING, INDUSTRIAL, AND TECHNOLOGY POLICIES
and how they map into different policy measures and institutions. They 
recognize that policy frameworks need to pay attention to building the 
“capabilities” of actors and also to curb rent seeking and inertia. They 
argue that in achieving development objectives, incentives via altering 
prices such as protection or subsidies are not likely to be sufficient. In this 
context, they contrast the stylized Latin American experience with that of 
the East Asian “tigers” (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore). 
Cimoli and Dosi then turn to how to motivate learning and accu-
mulation of capabilities and the increase in productive capacity. They 
emphasize that while innovation may give rise to rents, these rents may 
incentivize research, and rents may be necessary for financing innova-
tion in the absence of a well-functioning financial market. Even inno-
vation rents today do not automatically get reinvested into producing 
innovation in the future. They elaborate on the three aspects of strategies 
designed to promote innovation and the accumulation of capabilities: 
carrots, sticks, and competition. 
Cimoli and Dosi’s last two sets of policy prescriptions pertain to avoid-
ing the natural resource curse and the imperative of consistency between 
macroeconomic and industrial polices.
Cimoli and Dosi, as well as Ocampo in chapter 3, also note that the 
world has changed in ways that provide challenges to the effective imple-
mentation of some of the “old” policies that worked in the past. In partic-
ular, they point to the constraints imposed by globalization and changes 
in global rules such as those reflected in World Trade Organization 
(WTO) commitments and bilateral and “plurilateral” investment and 
trade treaties. Both Cimoli and Dosi and Ocampo examine in distinc-
tive ways how these constraints impact industrial policies and how the 
adverse effects can be mitigated. After noting the several loopholes and 
flexibilities that developing countries can exploit, they make a case against 
bilateral trade and investment treaties and in favor of a reform of the 
international rules governing trade and intellectual property rights. Both 
chapters conclude with a call for a reform of the current framework of 
such international rules.
The contribution by José Antonio Ocampo (chapter 3) provides a 
grand sweep of the literature on economic growth and structural change 
and places the role of industrial policies in that broader context. He con-
trasts the neoclassical focus on static efficiency with what is needed for 
sustained growth: “Economic growth in developing countries is intrinsi-
cally tied to the dynamics of production structures and to the specific 
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policies and institutions created to support them. The major focus is on 
the dynamic efficiency of economic structures, defined as their capacity to 
generate new waves of structural change . . . .” 
Ocampo makes extensive use of the “old” and “new” literature on 
growth and development. He first addresses the methodological issues 
that arise in (1) distinguishing between what Madison (1991) refers to as 
“proximate” and “ultimate” causes and (2) the direction of causality given 
the simultaneous movement of a series of variables with growth (invest-
ment, production structures, technology, human capital, etc.). 
Ocampo then sketches the regularities characterizing the growth pro-
cess, providing a succinct discussion of five sets of stylized facts that are 
of special importance in understanding growth and their implications: 
(1) the persistence of large intercountry difference in several dimensions;
(2) the large discontinuities that generally characterize growth (which
often tends to come in spurts); (3) the importance of elastic factor sup-
plies in the development process; (4) the path dependence of growth; and
(5) the variability of successful trade policy packages, which argues against
the simplistic generalizations about what constitutes “good” trade policy
that have been all too common.
Ocampo then distinguishes “framework conditions” (macroeconomic 
stability, basic institutions, human capital, infrastructure) that are neces-
sary for growth from the active determinants of the growth momentum, 
the ability to generate continually new dynamic activities. He argues that 
it is “the system-wide processes,” including interactions among (1) inno-
vations and learning and (2) complementarities, linkages, or networks 
among production activities that matter the most. 
He concludes that “the key to rapid growth in the developing world 
is the combination of strategies aimed at the dynamic transformation of 
productive structures with appropriate macroeconomic conditions and 
stability . . .” (emphasis added). 
Both of these papers on conceptual and theoretical foundations also 
point to the importance of development finance, especially the role of 
development banks in providing long-term capital for new activities of 
the sort they emphasize. The four chapters of part II are devoted to devel-
opment finance, a topic that has been widely recognized as important 
in the recent literature on industrial policies but elsewhere has received 
rather scant attention. Together, the four chapters not only present the 
theoretical case for development banks—explaining why conventional 
financial market institutions fail to meet certain societal needs—but also 
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demonstrate that a number of successful development banks have made 
a difference in the development of their countries. Of course, there have 
been failures of development banks in the past, sometimes associated with 
politically connected lending. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of research 
on development banks (perhaps reflecting the long period during which 
they were out of favor). The key question is: Why have some banks suc-
ceeded and others failed?
João Carlos Ferraz in chapter 4 notes that the 2008 financial crisis and 
its lingering aftermath have brought renewed attention to development 
banks, including notably for the countercyclical role they have played. 
Had they not continued to provide finance, the economic crises in these 
countries would have been deeper. But that is secondary to the main 
purpose of development banks, which is to overcome financial market 
imperfections, especially for longer-term investment and structural trans-
formation. (Of course, avoiding the volatility of private finance has long 
been held as one of the advantages of development banks.) 
Over the years, development banks have been subject to extensive 
criticism. Ferraz tackles head on some of these, such as the alleged crowd-
ing-out effect of development banks: that they crowd out private banks, 
which (under the standard neoliberal framework) are presumptively bet-
ter at allocating scarce capital. On the contrary, he asserts they can also 
“crowd in” private finance. Other criticisms are associated with political 
interference and cronyism and the inability of any public institution to 
outsmart the private sector in “picking winners.” He suggests ways—
institutional designs—in which the risks of these potential problems 
can be mitigated (e.g., clear segregation of functions, independent board 
members, banking supervision). 
Ferraz shows that development banks have become a major source of 
finance within the global economy, with a combined asset base of the 
23 members of the International Development Finance Club (IDFC) 
of around $2.8 trillion in 2013. As a ratio of GDP, the sizes of national 
development banks vary greatly, with their asset base ranging from 
0.5 percent of GDP in Indonesia to more than 14 percent in China, 
Brazil, and Germany. 
Ferraz chooses four of the largest development banks for a more 
detailed analysis of their structure, behavior, and performance in recent 
years. These are the China Development Bank (CDB), Kreditanstalt 
fur Wideraufbau (KfW) in Germany, BNDES in Brazil and the Japan 
Finance Corporation (JFC). He finds many more similarities than 
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differences among them and judges them on the whole to be success-
ful in achieving their developmental objectives while turning in a “very 
sound financial performance . . . based on a strong asset base” in 2013. 
JFC appears to be an exception, with negative profits and the highest 
nonperforming loans ratio. But even that is modest, at less than 3 percent 
of loans being nonperforming. CDB and BNDES had the best financial 
performance among the four banks, with returns on equity exceeding 
15 percent and a nonperforming loans ratio of 0.01 and 0.48 percent, 
respectively. Ferraz concludes that development banks “are one of the pil-
lars of a resilient financial system . . . relevant for countries at all stages of 
development.”
While development banks have typically been thought of as insti-
tutions relevant for developing countries, they have in fact played 
an important role even in advanced European economies. Stephany 
Griffith-Jones and Giovanni Cozzi (chapter 5) ask how development 
banks can promote investment, particularly in Europe. They begin by 
noting that the global private financial sector has been wanting in per-
forming any of the functions that it is supposed to perform, and thus 
increased attention needs to be paid to “the positive role that effective 
public development banks can play.” Griffith-Jones and Cozzi pro-
vide a succinct analytical case for development banks, beginning with 
the endemic and serious failures in financial markets, in particular as 
elaborated by Stiglitz in his writings. Notwithstanding these failures—
well documented in practice and well explained in theory—there was 
a strong belief in some quarters in the efficiency of financial markets. 
These beliefs, combined with political pressure from the financial sector, 
led to excessive financial liberalization and a push against public lending 
institutions. There are many ironies: the World Bank, a public devel-
opment bank, encouraged countries to close down their development 
banks, arguing that they can’t work; and during and after the financial 
crisis, government had to take on a massive financial role—had it not, 
the private financial system would have collapsed. Even today, in the 
United States, the government underwrites virtually all home mortgages. 
After elucidating the types of failures that financial markets are prone to, 
Griffith-Jones and Cozzi hone in on the roles that development banks 
do play and need to play—and how development banks can effectively 
play these roles—in promoting the kinds of industrial policies, enhanc-
ing dynamic efficiency, that the earlier contributions of Cimoli and Dosi 
and of Ocampo have emphasized. 
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Griffith-Jones and Cozzi then simulate alternative scenarios for Europe 
and the global economy, employing the Cambridge Alphametrics Model 
(CAM) for the period until 2020 to show the “very positive impact 
that a greater role of development banks—together with slowing down 
of excessive fiscal consolidation—can have on investment, growth and 
employment . . . and debt to GDP ratios.” 
Go Shimada, in chapter 6, examines the role of development banks in 
Japan. Shimada begins with a nuanced discussion of the pros and cons of 
development banks. On the rationale for such banks he emphasizes, in 
particular, the financial market imperfections stemming from informa-
tion asymmetries, externalities, and the risks of long-term investments, 
especially when there are economies of scale. Among the cons he notes are 
the difficulties of assessing loan applications, especially given the need to 
focus on economic and social benefits instead of simple profitability; and 
the risks of political capture or rent seeking. The main part of the chapter 
is a detailed case study of the “vital role” of development banks in Japan’s 
industrial policies after World War II. The government “played an impor-
tant role in both collecting deposits and allocating finance to industrial 
development.” The former reflected the special importance of the postal 
banks in Japan, which held about 20 percent of the total bank deposits 
even as late as the 1980s. 
Shimada’s analysis of development banking in Japan is embedded in 
an insightful discussion of Japan’s postwar recovery and development. 
The Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB) was established in 1947, and its 
financing, particularly of coal and steel industries, was a “crucial contrib-
uting factor” to Japan’s postwar reconstruction. But it succumbed to rent-
seeking activities of the sort that reflect corruption rather than creation 
of value, and after a corruption scandal, it was shut down and replaced 
by the Japan Development Bank (JDB). Shimada says that the lessons 
learned from the “capture” of RFB were used in the design of the JDB—
in particular, to insulate it from the influence of assorted outside agen-
cies—and that this much greater autonomy and the high quality of its 
project appraisal and supervision processes were vital to its success. Also 
crucial was the fact that JDB lending “was embedded in the government’s 
industrial policy.” Shimada provides a detailed discussion of JDB opera-
tions. Starting with “basic industries” (electricity, iron and steel, ship-
building and coal), it shifted to financing manufacturing industries that 
were deemed to have high spillovers and complementarities; hence, this 
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“was not an unadulterated picking the winner out of thin air type of 
intervention.” Shimada also finds that JDB played a role in overcoming 
asymmetries of information in the financial markets in Japan. JDB loans 
lowered risks for other banks by signaling government support, and the 
information was seen as reliable because “JDB’s lending had broader aims 
than profit maximization.”
The paper notes the context specificity of successful development 
banks in other countries such as Brazil, China, Malaysia, Korea, and 
Taiwan in the way they overcame “issues such as rent seeking and politi-
cal capture, and to complement the work of markets” as a lead-up to the 
question of lessons from Japan’s experience. Shimada stresses the impor-
tance of autonomy and loan appraisal expertise (including the develop-
ment of the institutional capacity to make such appraisals), aspects of 
development banking that other scholars of development have noted. 
But he also emphasizes the importance of a “a strong network among 
the institution’s stakeholders”; a “good division of labor with other . . . 
banks”; clarity in the “division of labor inside the [bank’s] institutional 
framework”; the need to renew and reform the institution to fight the 
tendency to institutional ossification; and focus on supporting activi-
ties with large “vertical and horizontal externalities,” observing that such 
externalities contribute to strengthening the networks that play a central 
role in the success of development banks. 
The last chapter on development banks, chapter 7 by Deepak Nayyar, 
examines the Indian experience and its lessons. Nayyar places the Indian 
experience in a broad historical and cross-country context. He begins 
with a discussion of “catch-up” industrialization, development finance, 
and industrial policy in general terms, noting that the “economic logic 
of development banks is simple. In . . . latecomers to industrialization, 
capital markets are imperfect . . . . [N]ew firms . . . find it exceedingly 
difficult to obtain finance for their initial investment, let alone to cover 
the losses of the learning period . . . [T]he problem is compounded when 
such investments are characterized by lumpiness and . . . gestation lag[s].” 
He traces the historical origins of development banking to the finan-
cial institutions that emerged in Europe from around the middle of the 
nineteenth century that served as role models for the development banks 
in postwar Germany and Japan, and he provides a quick sketch of the 
founding of development banks starting with Mexico and Chile in the 
1930s and ending with the China Development Bank in 1994. 
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Nayyar then turns to the Indian experience. That turns out to be both 
complicated and mixed. He distinguishes three phases: the late 1940s 
to mid-1960s; the 1980s; and the late 1990s onward. He comments that 
the “first phase, which kick-started industrialization, was the most sig-
nificant.” In this phase, three national (federal) level development finan-
cial institutions (DFIs)5 and a number of state level development banks 
were established. The second, in the 1980s, saw a number of refinanc-
ing, sector-specific or specialized institutions (for agriculture, housing, 
small-industries, urban development, rural electrification, exports and 
imports, power, railways, renewable energy, and tourism). India seems 
to have ended up with an extraordinarily complex and multidimensional 
network of numerous DFIs before scaling back sharply in the third phase 
beginning in the late 1990s. Except for India Infrastructure Finance 
Company Limited (IIFCL), the development banks became also—and 
in some cases, only—commercial banks. By the end of the 2000s there 
was a sharp reduction in the role of development banking. The only 
remaining long-term lending financial institution exclusively lending to 
industry is the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI), 
and the only institution that still lends to the industrial sector generally 
rather than to specific subsectors is the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC). 
Both are profitable as are the refinancing institutions that continue to 
exist. Among the sector-specific institutions, the Export-Import (EXIM) 
bank, Rural Electrification (REC), Power Finance Corporation (PFC), 
Indian Railways Finance Corporation (IRFC), and Housing and Urban 
Development Corporation (HUDCO) are active and profitable. 
The importance of DFIs in financing investment in manufacturing 
was very considerable even after the initial kick-starting phase in the 1950s 
and 1960s: 10 percent in 1970–71; 30 percent in 1980–81; 36 percent in 
1990–91; and 49 percent in 2000–01 before collapsing to 6 percent in 
2005–06 and recovering to 14 percent in 2012–13. The proportion was 
much higher for the private sector: 25 percent in 1970–71 and 75 percent 
in 2000–01 (thus public funding of investment in manufacturing either 
via development banks or directly—including retained earnings of pub-
lic sector enterprises—was extremely important). Nayyar attributes the 
decline of development banks to financial sector reforms “influenced, if 
not driven by the World Bank.” The cost of borrowing for DFIs rose sig-
nificantly with a sharp reduction in concessional financing by the Reserve 
Bank of India and in government-guaranteed bonds. Thus “eroding prof-
itability was a self-fulfilling prophecy . . . [c]ompounded by their past sins 
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which led to an accumulation of nonperforming assets.” Nayyar’s chapter 
also stresses that the weaknesses of DFIs in India include notably inad-
equate protection from political capture and that their lending had feeble 
links to industrial policies. The industrial policies, in turn, had their own 
weaknesses, especially the absence of mechanisms to ensure that the rents 
to which they gave rise were used productively (the importance of which 
was emphasized by several other contributions to this volume including 
notably by Ocampo and by Cimoli and Dosi). Nayyar concludes that the 
weaknesses of the relationship between DFI lending and industrial poli-
cies and the deficiencies of the latter in India provide important lessons 
for development finance. 
While there have been and continue to be many highly successful 
development banks, there are also many examples of failures mainly on 
account of political capture and rent seeking. They are high-risk, high-
rewards institutions that require a state broadly committed to pursuing 
developmental goals (sometimes referred to as a development state) to 
realize their potential. Other notable examples of success, not covered in 
this volume, include the Development Bank of Ethiopia in recent years 
(Abebe and Schaefer 2015)6 and development banks in Pakistan during 
the 1950s and 1960s (Noman 1991 and 2015, Papanek 1967). 
Noman (2015) proposes some ways of mitigating the risks that arise 
in contexts of “messy” governance, such as in Pakistan in more recent 
times. These include a tightly defined, narrow mandate of lending 
for low-hanging fruits of incontrovertible “winners” (such as lending 
to help move firms to the “best practice” frontier within some sectors 
in the country; in the case of Pakistan, technological upgrading of its 
textile sector). Other ways of risk mitigation proposed in that paper 
include regular and frequent public disclosure in parliament of lending 
and loan repayments as well as appropriate civil society representation 
on the board. 
Mitigation of risks is also an important concern of chapter 8 in part 
III by Justin Yifu Lin, chief economist of the World Bank from 2008 to 
2012. The fact that the chief economist of the World Bank devoted so 
much of his tenure to the advocacy of industrial policies shows how much 
the Bank—and development thinking more broadly—has changed since 
the heyday of neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus.7 He focuses 
not so much on the risks pertaining to development banking as on those 
associated with industrial policies more broadly. (This is a revised version 
of work Lin has already published, but we consider it worth reproducing 
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here, especially since its earlier version was discussed at a meeting of the 
Task Force that resulted in this volume).
Justin Yifu Lin in chapter 8 argues that historical experience since 
around the beginning of the nineteenth century shows that industrial 
policies are necessary for catching up but that more often than not they 
have been unsuccessful in developing countries in the postwar period 
beginning in the 1940s. He proposes that industrial policies be embed-
ded in what he terms new structural economics whose conceptual basis 
is rooted in historical experience. Lin pithily summarizes the gist of his 
arguments as follows: 
(1) Sector-targeted industrial policy is essential to achieve dynamic
structural change and rapid, sustained growth in the economy; (2) most
industrial policies fail because they target industries that are not compat-
ible with the country’s comparative advantage; (3) successful industrial
policies should target industries that are the countries’ latent comparative
advantage; (4) historical experiences show that in the catching-up stage,
successful countries industrial policies, in general, have targeted the
industries in countries with a similar endowment structure and some-
what higher per capita income; and (5) the growth identification and
facilitation framework [GIF] based on new structural economics, is a
new, effective way to target latent comparative advantage industries and
support their growth.
The gist of the GIF is to identify the latent comparative advantage 
that is to be exploited by identifying well-established industries in rapidly 
growing countries with a per capita income not much higher than twice 
the level of the country at hand. 
There was a particularly lively discussion at the meeting of the task 
force where Lin’s paper was discussed. There was a widely shared con-
sensus that there is much to be said for Lin’s approach and that it serves 
to guard against the risk of “picking losers.” However, some participants 
questioned his analysis of past successes, some of which involved leap-
frogging and more active promotion of dynamic comparative advantage—
seemingly going more against the comparative advantage of the moment 
than Lin’s framework allows. Also questions were raised about whether 
factor endowments as reflected in per capita incomes were adequate indi-
cators of what constitutes “nearness” or latent comparative advantage, 
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especially in a context of mobility of capital and highly skilled labor, rapid 
technological change, and evolving global value chains. Perhaps the most 
important “endowment” of a country was assets that were not mobile—
institutions and learning capacities that were embedded in local institu-
tions. It was these that countries needed to take into account as they 
struggled to shape their long-term (dynamic) comparative advantage; and 
in doing so, they also needed to take into account how what they chose to 
do would affect their learning abilities, which would, in turn, determine 
their future evolution.8
The remainder of part III contains a collection of papers on various 
aspects of industrial policies pursued in the past and proposed future 
practice. 
Antonio Andreoni in chapter 9 shows that the term industrial policy 
applies to a wide variety of policy interventions and that virtually all coun-
tries can be said to have industrial policies. He comments that “under-
standing the ‘policy context’ in which industrial policies are designed, 
implemented . . . is critical for disentangling the varieties of industrial 
policy we observe today.” He develops a methodology for analyzing the 
variety of industrial policy models and policy packages and applies this 
methodology to six country cases: United States, Japan, Germany, Brazil, 
China, and South Africa. 
Whilst Andreoni provides a general historical overview and briefly 
sketches the particular history in each of his six cases, his main focus 
is on present and very recent policies, especially those adopted after 
the 2008 crisis. For example, in the United States, the several industrial 
policy actions identified by Andreoni include two programs run by the 
Small Business Administration (SBA); a subset of initiatives under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act; measures to overcome shortages 
of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) graduates; 
clean energy initiatives; and a “new industrial policy package” since 2010 
that includes “a number of selective measures aimed at strengthening the 
domestic manufacturing base as well as its presence in the international 
market.” These include a new National Network for Manufacturing 
Innovation (NNMI), which is a “web of . . . institutes working on the 
development and adoption of advanced manufacturing technologies,” as 
well as a number of high-tech initiatives (Materials, Genome, Robotics, 
etc.). The post-2010 industrial policy package in the United States also 
includes initiatives to promote exports. 
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We have chosen to illustrate the broad sense in which industrial pol-
icies can be said to be pursued with examples from the United States 
because there is probably greater resistance to the idea of industrial policy 
in that country than anywhere else, or at any rate in any of the other 
countries in Andreoni’s sample. The label industrial policy is not applied 
to any of the policies, though they are clearly just that. 
In concluding, Andreoni, while noting the differences among his six 
countries, remarks that “Despite the variety of . . . industrial policy . . . 
all countries are adopting a mix of selective sectoral policies and manufac-
turing system policies . . . [that] go beyond sectoral boundaries and focus 
on linkages across sectors.” He adds that all six countries “have increas-
ingly strengthened their technological and financial support to the overall 
manufacturing . . . system.” 
In a broadly similar vein, in chapter 10, Akio Hosono follows up 
his overview of the literature on the critical importance of learning 
and innovation for growth and development by examining different 
approaches effective in “promoting learning to attain transformation 
with good quality growth.” He does so by examining five case stud-
ies of highly varied approaches which he classifies into two categories: 
learning a specific capacity/capability and learning to learn.9 The case 
studies pertain to (1) small-scale farmers in horticulture in Kenya; (2) 
rural infrastructure development in Bangladesh; (3) rural livelihood 
improvement (seikatsu kaizen) programs in Japan and some developing 
countries; (4) the One Village, One Product (OVOP) initiative in Japan 
and its dissemination to Thailand and Malawi; and (5) Just-in-Time, 
Total Quality Management, and Kaizen in Japan, the United States, 
Singapore, and some other countries. This last receives the greatest 
attention. 
The richness of Hosono’s chapter lies particularly in the details, and 
hence it is least amenable to summarizing. The upshot in Hosono’s words 
is as follows: “The case studies illustrate how learning and the accumula-
tion of knowledge capabilities play a vital role . . . . Several approaches 
for learning . . . were identified . . . that not only promote learning 
but also facilitate learning to learn.” Hosono also notes several common 
features of these different approaches, e.g., easy entry points; focus on 
learning by doing and mutual learning, and the intrinsic contribution 
of learning to the particular objective being pursued. He also emphasizes 
the importance of learning for a green economy and more generally for 
“high-quality” growth. 
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In chapter 11, Carlota Perez makes a case for natural resource (NR) 
based industrialization. Perez provided an excellent abstract of her paper, 
and we can do no better than to quote it: 
This chapter argues that development is a moving target, and that windows 
of opportunity to both “catch up” and “leap ahead” present themselves at 
certain times and in specific regions due to technological revolutions and 
paradigm shifts. Having examined the historical precedents, it observes 
that the exploitation and processing of natural resources (NR), once seen 
as a “curse” for developing nations, present such an opportunity for Latin 
America and other resource-rich countries at this stage in the diffusion 
of the ICT revolution. The factors changing the context and conditions 
around NR are analyzed, from the new nature of markets and the growing 
influence of environmental factors to the significant increase in techno-
logical dynamism and potential for innovation in developing countries 
brought about by ICT and market segmentation. Examining the specific-
ity of Latin America in its ability to respond to these different conditions, 
and identifying the capabilities gained in the previous opportunity with 
import substitution, the article argues that success today would depend 
upon building natural resource-based networks of innovation aimed at 
the dynamic Asian markets. Given the low labor intensity of most NR 
processing industries, a dual-integrated strategy of “resource-intensive 
industrialization” is proposed which promotes both top-down economic 
growth for global positioning and bottom-up wealth creation in each cor-
ner of the territory generating employment and well-being for all. It is 
finally argued that such a converging process of growth and innovation 
is both possible and necessary to ensure that Latin America benefits from 
the current window of opportunity while building a platform of inno-
vative potential, networks and social capabilities in order to be able to 
leap forward with the next technological revolution. The many obstacles 
and limitations are not ignored; they can only be faced successfully if the 
nature of the opportunity is fully recognized.
At the time the article was written, Latin America was experiencing a 
natural resource boom—a boom that has since ended. It is evident that 
some countries availed themselves more of the kinds of ideas Perez advo-
cates than did others and that some diversified more than others; with the 
collapse of natural resource prices, those that didn’t diversify have experi-
enced particularly marked slowdowns and even recessions.
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Nobuya Haraguchi in chapter 12 seeks to “better understand how com-
parative advantage, productivity growth, and country-specific conditions 
drive industrial development.” To do so, in his empirical work Haraguchi 
undertakes regression analysis of “the evolving patterns of manufactur-
ing industries and corresponding changes in productivity.” The avail-
ability of data limits the coverage to 73 countries. His conclusion can 
be summarized as follows: “the development patterns of manufacturing 
industries . . . indicate the existence of comparative advantage, whose 
shift is associated with changes in GDP per capita. Even successful coun-
tries like . . . Korea have generally followed these patterns.” This chap-
ter thus complements and buttresses the earlier one by Justin Yifu Lin 
(chapter 8). Haraguchi adds: “. . . our research suggests how different 
schools of thought on industrial development, such as comparative 
advantage, technological development and functional approaches, all 
have a place in explaining the performance of industrial development and 
account for different aspects of development. Future research is needed 
to further investigate the country-specific conditions and how they are 
translated into long-term country-specific advantages.”
In chapter 13, Ming Leong Kuan uses the new data of the European 
Commission’s World-Input-Output Database (WIOD) to examine 
whether and to what extent there is a symbiotic relationship between 
manufacturing and services that necessitates geographical proximity. He 
analyzes manufacturing-services linkages across countries and over time 
and finds strong colocational tendencies. He concludes: “Although inter-
national trade and ICT advancements have increased the potential for 
cross-border flows of services, manufacturing-services linkages have not 
fragmented to the extent that some countries can specialize as manufac-
turers while others focus on exporting intermediate services to them.” 
Kuan adds that for “developing countries seeking to bypass industrializa-
tion by undertaking a services-led path of development, an assessment 
will need to be made on whether the development of services can be sus-
tainable without the presence of a healthy producer sector . . . countries 
neglect their manufacturing sector at their own risks.” 
Of course, the service sector is a catchall that includes not just inter-
mediate services but also tourism, health, and education. There are some 
countries, such as Namibia, that have successfully diversified a rich natu-
ral resource economy with some manufacturing (often related to their 
natural resource base, as suggested by Perez), but even more importantly 
with a successful tourism sector.
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The set of papers emerging from the work of the joint IPD-JICA Task 
Force that are published here aim to make a contribution to the case for 
the vital role of government interventions of the industrial policy vari-
ety in promoting sustained economic growth in countries at all stages of 
development but especially those that need to catch up with countries 
at the frontier of economic prosperity. The studies show that industrial 
policies carry with them risks—as do all other policies; but the benefits 
can be great, especially if industrial policies are well thought through and 
well implemented. Part of successful design is to have policies that can 
be implemented within the countries’ institutional capacities and to have 
policies that enhance those institutional capacities. Countries and policy 
analysts have learned much from the failures and successes of the past, 
with the result that in many countries, industrial policies have played 
a vital role in their development. They have learned how to structure 
institutions, such as development banks, that bring expertise to the devel-
opment process and minimize the risks that undermined some earlier 
attempts at industrial policy. As Stiglitz has repeatedly emphasized, all 
countries have industrial policies; it is just that some countries don’t know 
it—and because they aren’t aware of how each of their policies, from 
expenditure to tax policies to their underlying legal/economic framework, 
affects the structure of the economy, there is a risk of ill-conceived poli-
cies, reflecting the interests of special interests.
The degrees of risk and rewards and the particular mix of appropri-
ate policies will, of course, vary according to the specific context of each 
economy. Hopefully this volume will serve to inform the policy choices 
facing countries both in the advanced world and in emerging markets 
and less developed countries, and will help them design institutions and 
policies appropriate for them. 
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